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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
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From: Navy Member, USCIB Special Committee to Study COMINT Personnel
Security Standards and Practices
To: Chairman, USCIB Special Committee
Subj: Recommendations for the Committee

I. Adequacy of present USCIB standards.

In the course of our deliberations several points relative to the adequacy of CIBD 5 became apparent.

First, there was general agreement that the language of the directive should be made more specific as to what constitutes an individual "of excellent character and discretion, and unquestioned loyalty."

Recommendation: That language similar to Section 8, Executive Order 10450 of 29 April 1953 or Section V of DOD Directive 5210.8 of 29 June 1955, be employed to detail what constitutes such an individual.

Second, there can be a real need for exceptions permitted under present language of the directive to use individuals who may be of "dubious loyalty". It is considered by Navy that approval by USCIB in each such case is a realistic safeguard.

Recommendation: That the feature of CIBD 5 permitting employment, but only with USCIB approval, of persons of dubious loyalty be retained.

Third, the requirement for reinvestigations at intervals of 5 years or even more often as was suggested, is unrealistic in light of present and anticipated capabilities of investigative agencies. It was further apparent that in the Petersen case routine reinvestigation did not provide the answer.

Recommendations: That CIBD 5 Para 6 be replaced by the following:

"Periodic Reinvestigations.

"Persons cleared for COMINT and retaining that status permanently or over a long period of time shall be subjected to such periodic reinvestigations as are considered necessary by the USCIB member concerned. Such reopened investigations shall be conducted by the investigative services available to that member agency. The minimum requirement for a reopened investigation shall consist of a National Agency Check and a review of an up to date Personal History Statement or other similar documentation. Reinvestigation shall be conducted whenever derogatory information arises about any individual cleared for COMINT and is relevant to his eligibility therefor.

ONI review(s) completed.

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"Where possible, reinvestigations shall routinely be made at intervals not to exceed five years. Those individuals deemed by the USCIB member concerned to occupy particularly 'sensitive' positions shall receive the most intensive, thorough reinvestigation possible and shall be reinvestigated as often as appropriate. A particularly 'sensitive' billet is considered to include one where the incumbent has the 'need to know', and has access to particularly sophisticated or a wide variety of crypt-analytic techniques, or who has a broad knowledge of U. S. COMINT resources and successes, or who may for other reasons be a likely target of foreign intelligence services."

Fourth, neighborhood checks as part of background investigations of COMINT personnel are not mandatory.

Recommendation: That CIBD 5 be revised to require a neighborhood check in investigation of all personnel requiring COMINT clearances.

Fifth, the reasoning underlying the permissive wording in CIBD 5 paragraph 5.b. is not understood wherein the individual being indoctrinated for COMINT shall: "...be instructed in the general nature of COMINT and the general principles of COMINT protection, "or" completely familiarize himself with the specific regulations which govern ...etc."

Recommendation: That CIBD 5 (Para 5b(1) & (2)) be modified to insure that both "a general knowledge of nature of COMINT, etc." and knowledge of "specific regulations which govern etc." are required as part of indoctrination.

II. Current Navy Practice

COMINT cleared personnel fall into the two broad classes of "producer" and "consumer". In general, the "producers" are career COMINT personnel from the Naval Security Group and "consumers" occupy billets requiring COMINT clearance for a single tour of duty.

Personnel Selection: Most "producer" enlisted personnel enter their COMINT career from "boot camp". Their selection is based initially on their attaining above average standards in the battery of tests used in classifying personnel as to ability, aptitude for naval service, etc. Further screening includes review of record of conduct, examination of Personal History Statement for preliminary assessment of clearability and a final interview with a representative from the Naval Security Group.

A small number of enlisted men enter COMINT careers via the organized reserve. They are selected on their record and on results of an interview with the District Officer for Reserves, Naval Security Group.

A few enlisted rated men who enter COMINT careers directly from the Fleet are screened by Naval Security Group personnel at BuPers on their records.

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Officers enter "producer" COMINT careers from several sources. Ensigns entering from ROTC, OCS programs and from the Naval Academy are screened principally on their records, but are interviewed whenever practicable. Reserve Officers are screened on their records and by interview with the District Officer for Reserves, Naval Security Group. Officers requesting permanent assignment to the Naval Security Group from general service are screened on their record and a limited number are selected by special selection boards.

"Consumer" personnel, largely senior officers and responsible civilian officials, represent approximately 1/7 of total COMINT indoctrinated individuals. They are assigned on the basis of their qualifications for the command or billet they occupy. It is only after the need to know has been established for that particular billet or command that the question of "clearability" is considered.

There are no facilities for special psychiatric screening of either "consumer" or "producer" candidates nor is the polygraph always used for screening purposes.

Investigations: Investigations of Navy COMINT personnel pose no special problems from a purely operational investigative standpoint. They necessarily contribute to our overall investigative commitments, although not excessively. COMINT cases are given priority handling. This naturally has a limiting effect on other programs which might require preferential handling, but in the light of the sensitivity of the work involved, the decision to afford these background investigations a top priority is considered sound.

The investigative standards for COMINT personnel parallel, for the most part, those prescribed for background investigations under E. O. 10450. The most important refinement is for the interviewing of at least two "developed" character references, i.e., two or more persons contacted during the investigation who were not named by the subject as personal references. These developed informants are in addition to normal sources of information such as neighbors, past employees, etc. In every case a neighborhood check is considered by Navy mandatory for individuals under consideration for COMINT clearances. Indices checks of foreign national investigative agencies are made in the cases of the personnel having close associates residing in or nationals of the countries concerned. The polygraph is one of many investigative techniques and is used where indicated in establishing leads or in confirming information already developed.

Reinvestigations: Automatic reinvestigation at five year intervals is established for career COMINT personnel. A new Personal History Statement is obtained in which at least three of the personal references given by the subject must be individuals whom he has not given previously. Assuming 4000 career personnel, military and civilian, as a permanent base, the average number for reinvestigation is approximately 70 cases a month. This is not an overwhelming number, but it is believed that a more effective program would be based not on reinvestigation of all personnel at a five year interval but on frequent and more intensive reinvestigation of those engaged in particularly "sensitive" or "likely target" positions. Reinvestigation would, of course, continue to be made in every instance where derogatory information developed, regardless of time interval.

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Education and Supervision: COMINT security education within the Navy is not uniform and varies in effectiveness. All individuals cleared for COMINT receive a basic initial indoctrination. The bulk of the enlisted "producer" personnel enter their COMINT career via Communications Technicians Class "A" schools where security education is an important element of the curriculum. As many as 24 class periods in these schools are devoted to security, both general and COMINT, and include lectures, movies and examinations. Also, communication technician enlisted personnel eligible for advancement in rating are examined on both general and COMINT security practices and regulations.

Minimum refresher education for "producers" is quarterly re-reading of:

- a. Title 18 U.S.C., Sections 791-797 (Espionage and Censorship Act of 1948)
- b. Title 18 U.S.C., Section 798 (Public Law 513)
- c. President's Memo of 20 August 1945
- d. NavSecGru Entering Oath
- e. Persons indoctrinated in CSP 1805 series will read the appropriate indoctrination oath.

In addition, there are individually organized security education programs of varying effectiveness at some of Navy's field installations. Many of the career COMINT personnel, particularly officers, are assigned duty at NSA Washington and thus benefit from NSA's security education program. However, owing to the world-wide dispersal it is impossible to order all Navy Security Group personnel thru Washington.

All "consumer" personnel receive initial basic indoctrination. However, there is no centrally organized or directed refresher education program for this group other than "command attention" to matters of security and command responsibility relative thereto.

Recommendations:

1. That USCIB direct that the NSA security education program be extended in the field to make available uniform refresher security education to the field activities of all service cryptologic agencies. It is believed that this could be done readily through the various NSA area headquarters.
2. That all USCIB agencies be enjoined to provide aggressive refresher security education programs for all individuals not reached by the NSA Program. For the rest of the Navy, this could be done within the framework of the annual intelligence team visits by members of ONI to Naval commands in the various geographic areas and the periodic intelligence conferences in Washington, D.C.


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